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Abstract
This  paper  shows  how  heterogeneity  in  wage-setting  and  a link  between  nominal
wage  flexibility  and  goods-market  competition  arise  in  a multisector  economy  that  is
affected  by aggregate  and  sector-specific  shocks.  Aggregate  volatility  increases  the
variance  of  real  contract  wages,  whereas  sectoral  volatility  increases  the  relative
variance  of  real  Walrasian  wages.  Given  this  tradeoff,  the  prevalence  of nominal  wage
contracting  reflects  both  the relative  volatility  of aggregate  versus  sectoral  disturbances
and  the  overall  degree  of  goods-market  market  competition.  We  find  that  these
variables  help  explain  the  decline  in  unionization  (a  prory  for  contracting)  in  the  United
States.
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THE  FALL  OF  NOMINAL  WAGE  CONTRACTING:
ENDOGENoUS  WAGE  CONTRACTING  IN  A MULTISECTOR  ECONOMY
l. Introduction
Spurred  by  the  seminal  papers  by  Fischer  (1977a)  and  Gray  (1976),  a
voluminous  literature  has  explored  the  implications  of  nominal  wage  contracts
established  by rational  workers  and  firms. Yet  relatively  few  contributions  have
resolved  the  fundamental  question  first  debated  by  Barro  (1977)  and  Fischer  ('1977b):
\ffhy  would  workers  and  firms  in some  portion  of the  economy  adopt  contracts  that  fix
nominal  wages  and  thereby  move  these  agents  away  from  potentially  mutually
advantageous  opportunities  to improve  their  welfare?  Karni  (1983),  Duca  and
VanHoose  (1991),  and  others  have  relied  on  theoretical  models  in  which  wages  are
indexed  to  output  or  to profits  to motivate  ihe  potential  optimality  of  nominal  wage
contracting.  Although  forms  of  implicit  or  explicit  indexation,  such  as  profit  sharing,
undeniably  are  important  features  of  many  contracts,  the  rational  contracting  literature
continues  to lack  a clear  theoretical  explanation  for  why  nominal  wage  contracting
occurs  and  why  its  incidence  has  declined  so  sharply  since  the  early  1980s.
This  paper  offers  one  possible,  and  surprisingly  simple,  explanation  for  the
observation  of nominal  wage  contracting.  Although  it  differs  in  its  specific  approach,
this  explanation  relates  to  earlier  contributions  by  Gray  (1983)  and  Woglom  (1990),
which  focused  on  industry-specific  factors  that  influence  the  optimal  indexation  of  wage
contracts.  We find  that  nominal  contracts  are  likely  to be preferable  to relying  on
market-clearing  outcomes  if  sectoral  disturbances  are  sufficiently  variable  in  relation  to
aggregate  shocks.  Agreeing  to fix  the nominal  wage  over  an interval  exposes  workers
to real-wage  volatility  arising  from  aggregate  price  fluctuations  that  stem  from  economy-wide  demand  and  supply  disturbances.  Nonetheless,  such  an  agreement  insulates
workers  from  real-wage  variability  resulting  from  sectoral  shocks.
This  intuitive  explanation  provides  the  foundation  for  a theory  for  the
determination  of  the  equilibrium  portion  of  sectors  that  choose  to  adopt  nominal  wage
contracts.  In  the  context  of a stylized  multisector  model,  we are  able  to examine  key
parameters  that  influence  the extent  to which  workers  and  firms  choose  to contract.
These  include  not  only  the  variances  of  aggregate  shocks,  but  also  the  variance  of
sectoral  shocks  and  the  degree  of  goods-market  competition.  Using  measures  of  the
extent  of  contracting  and  the  explanatory  variables  implied  by  the  theory,  we  find
evidence  supporting  the  theory's  implication  that  sectoral  volatility  and  goods-market
competition  play  key  roles  in  determining  the  degree  of  contracting  in  the  U.S.  economy
and  in  explaining  why  contracting  has  fallen  since  the  mid-1950s.  Note  that  most  of  the
drop  in  unionization  since  the  early  1980s  is  due  to  declines  in  unionization  rates  within
industries,  rather  than  to shifts  in  employment  across  industries  (see  Table  1).
Table I Goes  Here
The  next  section  of  the  paper  develops  our  model  and  uses  it  to  demonstrate  the
conditions  under  which  nominal  wage  contracts  can  be  optimal.  Section  lll extends  this
model  to  construct  our  theory  of  the  determination  of  the  equilibrium  portion  of  the
economy  that  opts  to contract.  Section  lV  provides  the  empirical  analysis.  Section  V
offers  some  concluding  thoughts  about  our  model's  implications.
ll. The  Model  and  lts Solution
The  model  parallels  the  multisector  framework  developed  by  Duca  and
VanHoose  (1997,  1998).  lt  extends  Ball's  (1988)  framework  by  incorporating  some
features  from  the  Duca-VanHoose  (1991)  multisector  model.  The  latter  actually  is  a
two-sector  extension  of Duca  (1987),  whereas  the  present  model  truly  allows  formultiple  sectors.  1 Specifically,  in  the  present  framework  there  is  a continuum  of
sectors,  indexed  l, that  are  distributed  uniformly  across  a unit  interval.  Each  sector  is
occupied  by  large  numbers  of  representative  firms  and  workers.  All  behavioral
relationships  are  expressed  in  terms  of logarithms,  and  most  constants  are  suppressed
in  the  exposition  to simplify  the  presentation  of  the  model  and  its  key  implications.
The  production  function  for  a firm  in  sectorl  is
(1)  yi=  al,+6,
where  yi  is  the  log  of  firm/s  output,  4  is  the  log  of  employment  at  firm  j, and  d is  a
common,  zero-mean  productivity  shock  with  finite  variance  o62.  The  demand  for  firm  /s
output  as  a share  of  aggregate  output  is  given  by
(2)  Yi-  Y  = -4P1-  P)  + 6',
where  y = lor  y.  d.1  is aggregate  output  and  p :  lo1  p,  dj is the  aggregate  price  level;
d,  is  a firm-specific  zero-mean  demand  shock  with  a finite  variance  (discussed  in  more
detail  in  section  lll);  and  e  > 1  is  the  elasticity  of  demand  for  the  output  of  firm7.  For  the
sake  of  expositional  clarity,  { is  the  single  sectoral  disturbance  faced  by  a firm.  lt is
straightfonarard  to  show  that  including  sectoral  supply  shock  greatly  complicates
expressions  for  worker  losses  that  we  consider  below  without  fundamentally  changing
comparisons  of the relative  effects  of sectoral  versus  aggregate  shocks.
Aggregate  demand  for  output  is  characterized  by  the  quantity  equation,
(3)  y=m+v-p,
where  vis a zero-mean  aggregate  demand  disturbance  with  finite  variance
variance  ou2.  All  three  types  of  shocks  (9,  {, and  v)  are  assumed  to be  i.i.d.Converting  (1),  (2),  and  (3)  into  levels  (denoted  by  upper-case  letters)  and
combining  with  the  profit  function  n,=  P,Y,-  W,L,yields  the  following  labor  demand
function  (with  the  intercept  term  suppressed):
(4)  tt" =
- e (wi  - p) + (m + v+  5i- p) + (€ -1)e
d +E - aa
where  w,  is  the log  of the nominal  wage  at a firm  in sectorl. Each  firm  acts  as a perfect
competitor  in  its  labor  market,  in  which  it  faces  a pool  of  sectorally  immobile  workers
whose  labor  supply  schedule  is  given  by
(5)  If = t'(w'-  p),
where;t  > 0. As in  Duca  (1987)  and  Duca  and  VanHoose  (1991)  [also  see  Carlson  and
Findlay  (1992)1,  the  crucial  aspect  of  this  stylized  structure  is  that  firms  value  the  real
wages  they  pay  in  terms  of  the  prices  of  the  products  that  they  produce,  while  workers
value  the  real  wages  that  they  earn  in  terms  of  the  aggregate  price  level.2
A fraction,  12,  of the  sectors  have  workers  and  firms  that  use  nominal  wage
contracts.  The  remaining  share,  1-O,  do  not. For  both  groups  of  sectors,  the  full-
information,  market-clearing  wage  equales  (4)  and  (5)  and  is  given  by
(m+v+6-p)+(c-110
\-,/  .,]  - 
P  _ ' 
A(a+e-at\+6
This  is  the  wage  actually  paid  by  a firm  in  sectorl  if  its  sector  is  among  the  share  1-O  of
sectors  that  do  not  use  contracts.  For  such  a firm,  denoted  "nc,"  substitution  of  (6)  into
either  (4)  or  (5)  yields  the  employment  level,
t1\,*  _ ll(m+  v + 6  - p)+ 1e-1)dl
\"  t  - 
1q"*"-*1  +"  '
At a contracting  firm,  however,  nominal  wage  contracts  are  set  to satisfo  w,  = Ery,= 0. Using  this  in (4)  yields  the employment  level  at a firm  in a contracting  sector:
/o\  t."  _ sp+  (m+  v + di - p)+  (€-1)e
&t  €-  dE
Using  (8)  in  (1)  implies  that  output  at  such  a contracting  firm  is  equal  to
dEp+  d(m+  v+6i  -p)+eg
\-/  t! 
-
d+  E-  da
Substituting  (9)  into  (2)  yields  an  expression  for  thelh contracting  secto/s  price  in
terms  of  the  quantity  of  money,  the  aggregate  price  level,  and  the  shocks:
/.,^\  ^"-  (1-a\(m  + v) - g + l@+ s - ae) - 1lP
u+  €-  da
For  a noncontracting  firm,  substituting  (7)  into  (1)  yields  the  output  expression,
tii\  ,,*  -  dL(m+  v+  6'P)+  6(l+7)0





Substituting  this  result  into  (2)  yields  the  sectoral  price,
(12)  Pjn" = lA.(1-a)+11(1n  + v + di)  - (1+  t)0  + {A(a +  e - ae) + 61  + l)v(1-a)+11}p
),(a+e-de)+e
Our  key  assumption  for  aggregating  output  and  prices  is  that  the  sector-specific
shocks  "wash  out"  when  summing  across  firms  within  each  group:  Jot  6,  d.1  = 0 and
li  a,  a1  = 0 for  all  O. Under  this  assumption,  the  aggregate  price  level  is  given  by
p= dhf l+o+ ft{4pi"la;..  Using  (10)  and  (12),  this  yields
(13)  p = U"(-a)+11(d +t  -  o;t) -  rz0l(m  + v) - l(+l)(a  +c  - at)  + a1" -1'19219
AIA@  + e  - ae)  + el  + (1-oxa  + e  - at)11(1-a)+11
Equation  (13)  permits  us  to  calculate  the  real  wages  faced  by  workers  in
individual  sectors.  For  a worker  in  thelh conkacting  sector,  the  real  wage  is(14) w" -P=  -P=
{aa - (a  +e - at)U.(-a)+1171p  * u) * l(1+l)(a  +e - ae)  + a(e -1)Ol0
Op.(a + s - dE')  + e] + (1-o)(d + t -  d€)l)'(1-a)+11
while  for  a worker  in  thelth noncontracting  sector,  the real  wage  is
(15)w1*-P= a{>(m  + v) + l(a  +s - ael + a(e -1)ol0
()IX(a+ e-  ae)+ el + (1-O)(a  + €-  d€)lA(1-a)+11  .L(a+ e-  ae)+ 5
An  immediate  implication  of  (14)  and  (15)  is  that  workers  who  agree  to use
nominal  wage  contracts  remove  sector-specific  shocks  as a source  of real-wage
volatility.  Only  aggregate  shocks  influence  the  real,  ex  posf  contracting  wage.  In
contrast,  workers  in noncontracting  sectors  expose  themselves  to real-wage  volatility.
On  average,  of  course,  the  values  ofthe  aggregate  and  sector-specific  shocks  are
equal  to  zero,  given  the  simplified  structure  of  the  model.  Consequently,  a risk-averse
worker  choosing  between  contractual  or Walrasian  wage  setting  must  assess  the
potential  increase  or  reduction  in  real-wage  volatility  in  light  of  exogenous  sources  of
aggregate  and  sector-specific  instability.  3
Differentiating  (14)  and  (15)  with  respect  to (m  + v)  yields
la@i"  -  p)ta@  +  ql= lo'aal
ano
I  a@f  -  ila@+  4 | = |  a1@n  -ft\1-a)+11(a+e  +ae)|1,
where  D is  the  denominator  in  (14)  and  (15).  Comparing  these  expressions  indicates
thatasufficientcondition  for  lagl"-p)h(m* 4l .  la@f  -p)ta@+  4ltohold
unambiguously  is  l2 < 112.  This  inequality  can  hold  for  a large  range  of  parameter
values  for  higher  values  of  f), however.  Hence,  for  many  possible  parameter  values,
the  real  wage  earned  by  a  worker  at  a firm  with  a nominal  wage  contract  is  more  volatile
in  the  face  of  exogenous  monetary  policy  innovations  and  aggregate  demand
disturbances.  Analogous  comparisons  indicate  that I  a(wr*  - pYael  <  |  a@f  - p)taoland  that l^(wi"  - flla61l  >  la@f  - ilad,l  = 0,  where  these  additional  comparisons  are
unambiguous  irrespective  of  the  magnitude  of  O. Consequently,  the  real  wage  of  a
worker  in  a contracting  sector  is  also  more  volatile  in  the  face  of  an  aggregate
productivity  shock.  By  definition,  however,  the  real  wage  in  a sector  with  nominal  wage
contracts  is unaffected  by sector-specific  disturbances-
These  comparisons  imply  that,  from  the perspective  of a risk-averse  worker
whose  utility  declines  with  greater  real  wage  volatility,  the  choice  between  nominal
wage  contracts  and  Walrasian  wage  setting  hinges  on  the relative  importance  of
aggregate  versus  sector-specific  shocks.  As  the  variances  of  aggregate  disturbances
increases  relative  to  the  variance  of  sectoral  shocks.  workers  in  more  sectors  will  tend
to prefer  nominal  wage  contracts  , ceteris  paibus.
lll. Determining  the  Equilibrium  Contracting  Share
According  to  the  theory,  what  portion  of  sectors  in  the  economy  will  rationally
adopt  nominal  wage  contracts?  To  address  this  question,  we  begin  by  making  three
final  assumptions.  First,  monetary  policy  is  determined  exogenously,  with  the
normalization  m = 0. Second,  firms  are  risk-neutral.4  This  leaves  the  decision  about
the  type  of wage  contract  to the  woker, given  that  both  contracts  yield  the  same  mean
real  wage,  employment,  output,  and  profit.
Finally,  we  assume  that  the  variance  of  sector-specific  shocks  is  equal  to
(1-lit  oa',  with  od2  > 0. Because  sectors  are  distributed  uniformly  over  the  interval  [0,
11,  the  variances  of  sector-specific  disturbances  decline  from  an  infinite  value  for  sector
zero  to  a value  of  zero  for  sector  1. This  implies  that  workers  in  sector  zero  always
prefer  to adopt  nominal  wage  contracts  lor oa2  > 0 and  that  workers  in sector  1 never
wish  to contract.  At a sector  located  halfirvay  along  the unit  interval,  the sectoral
variance  is exactly  equal  to op2;  whether  or not  workers  in  this  sector  or in sectors  to the
right  or  left  of  it  will  contract  depends  on  relative  real  wage  variances.Suppose  that  sector  l" is the  sector  for  which  workers  are  indifferent  between
nominal  wage  contracts  and  Walrasian  wages. For  the next  sector,  therefore,  it must
be  the  case  that  real-wage  volatility  under  a nominal  wage  contract  would  exceed  real-
wage  volatility  that  would  arise  without  such  a contract.  Firml',  therefore,  is  the  "critical
secto/'along  lhe unit  interval  for  which  a point  of  indifference  is  reached  concerning
adoption  of  a nominal  wage  contract.
We assume  that  workers  seek  to minimize  a weighted  average  of expected
deviations  of  the  real  wage  and  employment  from  their  Walrasian,  market-clearing
vatues,  or
(16)  L, = El(t,  - t;)'z+  1wj - d'?l.
where  /r'  is  the  Walrasian,  full-information  level  of  employment  (that  is,  the  employment






(a+  t-  ae) + e
It  follows  that  Lr'"  > L,."  for  workers  at all sectors  in  the interval  [0, y']. Hence,  y"defines
the  cutoff  point  beyond  which  workers  at  additional  firms  choose  not  to  contract,  withf
=  J2  in  equilibrium.
After  computing  these  expressions  from  (14)  and  (15)  and  rearranging,  we  find
that  the  equilibrium  portion  of  sectors  that  contract  solves  the  following  equation:ta  y o =  {6'z  - re't* el(1  -r4Ac+  eBl2  o} 2
" {e'ec'111u>ncr2-o2  dlo,2  + l1(1+  t)A+  d!z(€  -1r12-lA+  ar\e  -11!2}o621
+ ( |  r)lA2B2C2(82  t CIBC2|  +21a{) +lACft''+Bd4U"N41-lXA+(t  -1)!+  ECI
(18)
+  12lA  C  ft A +  B  q2  [1 -1.]A+  @  -  1  )12])  o  "'z
+ BC\B  C  23Ld  (  E  . D2  G2 q-  A'I
+2p"2  le  -1)(1  -  t)lAC(l -  Q+ e q1161*1)+(1  +  1)  Blld  (E  -1)+  Al-  A'z  A  an @  -lDI  )  o;71,
where A = c*€+da,  $=  l(a+e +ae)+6:,  and C = X(1-a)+1. lf ,l-  is sufficiently  large,  so
that  workers  place  a sufficiently  high  weighi  on  reducing  real-wage  volatility,  equation
(18)  indicates  thal  as o,|loaz  -+ @  or oe2loa2  -+.n (that  is,  as the  volatility  of aggregate
disturbances  dominates  the  volatility  of  sectoral  shocks),  then  O-+ 0,  and  the
equifibrium  share  of sectors  that  contract  approaches  zero. In contrast,  as ou2loo2  -+ 0
ot as o62lo52  -+ 0 (that  is,  as the  volatility  of sectoral  disturbances  ovenrvhelms  the
volatility  of  aggregate  shocks),  then  O-+ 1,  and  a//workers  contract.  Therefore,  as
discussed  above,  the  model  predicts  that  a smaller  portion  of  sectors  will  use  wage
contracts  as  the  variability  of  aggregate  disturbances  increases.  Greater  sectoral
volatility,  however,  leads  to a larger  share  of contract  sectors  over  a significant  range  of
parameter  values.
The  direction  of  the  effect  of higher  relative  sectoral  variability  on  the  equilibrium
extent  of  contracting  is  not  monotonic,  however.  In  the  limiting  case  in  which  f-+  0,  for
instance,  greater  sectoral  variability  provides  a disincentive  for  firms  to contract,
because  higher  aggregate  or  sectoral  disturbances  push  equilibrium  employment
farther  from  its  full-information,  market-clearing  level.  Thus,  there  is  a critical  value  of  ,l-
(expressed  in  terms  of  other  parameters  of  the  model)  below  which  greater  sectoral
volatility  reduces  the  equilibrium  portion  of  sectors  with  wage  contracts.5  On  net,l0
therefore,  the  model  leaves  open  the  net  direction  of  the  effect  of  a small  change  in
sectoral  volatility  on  the  equilibrium  contract  share.
Equation  (18)  is  a cubic  polynomial  in  .(2.  Nevertheless,  we  can  rearrange  (18)
and  implicitly  differentiate  to  find  that  0Q  | 0e  < 0  for  sufficiently  small  values  of  O,  so
that  a relatively  small  portion  of sectors  contract.  A further  requirement  for 012  I 0e  < 0
is  that,l-must  be  sufiiciently  large,  so  that  workers  place  sufficiently  large  weight  on  the
real  wage  component  of  their  loss  function.  6 Consequently,  for  a large  range  of
parameter  values  the  model  indicates  that  the  equilibrium  share  of  sectors  that  use
wage  contracts  will  decline  as  the  degree  of  goods-market  competition  increases.
The  intuition  behind  this  result  as  follows.  A rise  in  the  elasticity  of  demand
caused  by  an  increased  degree  of  goods-market  competition  reduces  the
responsiveness  of  a firm's  equilibrium  price  to  a sectoral  disturbance.  This  results  in  a
decline  in  the  sensitivity  of  the  marginal  revenue  product  to  sectoral  shocks.  Therefore,
the  positions  of  firms'  labor  demand  schedules  and  their  employment  choices  respond
less  completely  to sector-specific  shifts  in  the  output  demand  schedules  that  they  face.
The  result  is  a smaller  change  in  the  nominal  wage.  Because  sectoral  shocks  leave  the
aggregate  price  level  unaffected,  the  real  wage  is  unambiguously  less  volatile  in  the
face  of  sectoral  shocks  when  the  demand  elasticity  increases.
Aggregate  demand  shocks  also  induce  less  employment  volatility  for  both
contracting  and  noncontracting  firms  when  goods  markets  are  more  competitive.  For
most  ranges  of  parameter  values,  however,  the  contribution  of  common  demand
disturbances  to  aggregate  price  volatility  rises,  thereby  adding  to  variability  of  the  real
wage  at  a contracting  firm.  As long  as  real  wage  variance  is  a significant  factor  in
workers'  loss  valuations,  therefore,  greater  aggregate  demand  variability  in  the
presence  of increased  goods-market  competition  tends  to reduce  the extent  of nominal
wage  contracting.ll
Aggregate  productivity  shocks  contribute  directly  to labor  demand  variability,
which  causes  greater  employment  variability  at  both  type  of  firms.  The  real  wage
effects  of aggregate  supply  disturbances  differ,  however.  At noncontracting  firms,  a
negative  productivity  shock  reduces  the  equilibrium  nominal  wage  while  raising  the
aggregate  price  level;  at contracting  firms  such  shocks  affect  the real  wage  only
through  the  price-level  response.  Under  increased  goods-market  competition,  an
aggregate  supply  shock  induces  a smaller  price  response  at  firms,  as  discussed  above,
and  so  the  sensitivity  to  of  the  value  of  labor's  marginal  product  to such  a shock
declines.  Consequently,  the  effect  that  a productivity  disturbance  has  on  labor  demand
is  reduced  with  a higher  elasticity  of  demand,  making  the  nominal  wage  at
noncontracting  firms  less  responsive  to aggregate  supply  disturbances.  The  result  is
that  greater  goods-market  competition  reduces  the  real  wage  volatility  that  is  induced
by  supply  shocks  at noncontracting  firms  relative  to contracting  firms. Cefens  panbus,
this  leads  to  a reduction  in  the  equilibrium  share  of  firms  that  use  wage  contracts.
lV. Empirical  Analysis
Using  two-step  cointegration  methods,  we  test  our  model's  implications  that
contract  use  declines  if  the  degrees  of  goods-market  competition,  aggregate  demand
shock  variance,  or  aggregate  supply  variance  rise,  or,  for  low  contracting  economies
like  the United  States,  if the  variance  of sector-speclfic  shocks  falls. We  first  test  for
cointegration  among  contract  share,  inflation  risk,  the  degree  of  goods-market
competition,  aggregate  supply  variance,  and  the  variance  sectoral  nominal  output
growth.  Then  we  perform  second-stage  regressions  ofthe  change  in  the  log  of  contract
snare.
A.  Da|e  and Variables
The  variables  used  fall  into  five  @tegories:  contract  share,  aggregate  demand
variance,  supply  shock  variance,  goods-market  competition,  and  sectoral  variance.t?
Contract  Share  Given  the  absence  of  comprehensive  measures  of  the  share  of U.S.
workers  under  contracts,  we use  data  on  unionization  rates  in  the  private  sector.
Although  many  workers  have  annual  pay  adjustments,  we  are  more  interested  in
contracts  longerthan  a year,  because  such  contracts  expose  agents  to  a greater  risk  of
expectational  errors,  which  play  a key  role  in  determining  contract  share  in  our  model.
Union  contracts  generally  exceed  a  year  in  length,  and  for  this  reason  unionization
rates  appear  to be  a good  proxy  for  contract  share  (see  Figure  1).
Figure I Goes  Here
Contract  share  is  measured  by  splicing  annual  data  from  the  Bureau  of Labor
Statistics  (BLS)  and  Troy  and  Sheflin  (1985)  on  private  sector  unionization  rates,
including  employee  association  members  (see  Appendix  A). Our  theory,  of  course,
relates  more  directly  to nominal  wage  contracting  than  to unionization.  There  is,  of
course,  a broad  literature  that  assesses  determinants  of  labor  membership,  including
renlsharing  and  other  factors  that  can  contribute  to a potential  linkage  between  the
extent  of  unionization  and  the  degree  of  goods-market  competition  [see,  for  instance,
Ashenfelter  and  Pencavel  (1969),  Oswald  (1982),  Rau  (1985),  Neumann  and  Rissman
(1984),  and  Mason  and  Bain  (1993)1.  Consequently,  ourtheoretical  model's
macroeconomic-based  prediction  complements  existing  microeconomic  rationales  for  a
channel  from  goods-market  competition  to unions  and  longer-term  contracting.  One
difference  is  that  our  multisector  macroeconomic  model  predicts  that  the  variances  of
sectoral  and  aggregate  disturbances  are  additional  key  determinants  of  the  extent  of
nominal  wage  contracting  via  a mechanism  such  as  unionization.
Aggregate  Demand  Variance  In  our model,  aggregate  demand  variance  reduces  the
incentive  to  contract  mainly  by  introducing  inflation  risk,  which  we  proxy  using  annual
CPI  inflation  (lNF).  ? Holland  (1995)  uses  the  level  of  inflation  to  measure  inflation  riskon  grounds  that  prior  studies  [e.9.,  Evans  (1991)]  have  found  that  inflation  uncertainty  is
increasing  in  the  level  of  inflation.
Aggregate  Supply Shock  Variance  Aggregate  supply  shock  variance  (OILVAR)  is
proxied  by  the  3-year  moving  average  of  the  squared  percent  change  in  real  consumer
energy  prices  [using  (CPl  energy/CPl)  in  levels  back  to 1957  and  (PCE  gas  and  oil/PCE
fixed  weight  deflator)  in  levels  prior,  with  a break  adjustment  (see  Appendix  B).1
Goods-Market  Competition  The  degree  of goods-market  competition  (e)  is
measured  by  the  inverse  of  a measure  of  the  aggregate  markup.  The  raw  markup
[(price  divided  by marginal  cost)  minus  1] is measured  by  the ratio  of after-tax  profits  to
GDP  for  nonfinancial  corporate  businesses.  This  markup  is  adjusted  for  cyclical  and
short-run  effects  by subtracting  off  estimated  impacts  of the unemployment  rate,  oil
prices,  and  the  real  exchange  rate.  The  long-run,  cyclically  adjusted  degree  of
competition  equals  the  inverse  of  this  adjusted  markup  (see  Appendix  B). Figure  2
shows  that  awas  low  over  the  1960s  and  1970s  but  moved  into  a higher  range  in  the
1980s  and  1990s,  coinciding  with  waves  of  deregulation  in  the  transportation,  energy,
and  communications  industries  and  with  stiffer  foreign  competition  for  manufacturers.
Figure  2 Goes  Here
Sectoral  Variance  Shifts  in relative  sectoral  output  (SSHIFT)  are  proxied  by shifts  in
the  share  of  nominal  output  produced  by  difierent  U.S.  industries,  defined  as  the  sum  of
squared  percentage-point  changes  in  industry  output  shares  according  to  2-digit  SIC
data.  (Using  shares  implicitly  controls  for  relative  sizes  of  particular  industries,  given
that  data  for  real  industry  output  levels  are  unavailable  for  most  of  the  1950s-see
Appendix  C  for  details.)  Data  were  carefully  adjusted  for  shifts  in  category  definitions
and  other  sample  breaks.  To  capture  more  medium-run  swings  in  the  importance  of
relative  shocks,  we use  the  three-year  moving  average  of  SSHIFT  (SSHIFT3),  which  isplotted  in  Figure  3. Compared  with  using  Lillien  (1982)-type  dispersion  measures  of
employment  across  industries,  our  variable  more  closely  corresponds  to our  theoretical
model  and  avoids  the labor-hoarding-type  effects  stemming  from  delays  by  firms  in
adjusting  employment.  (The  inclusion  of  the  aggregate  supply  and  demand  variance
terms  in  the  log  cointegrating  vectors  implicitly  controls  for  oil  and  cyclical  influences
while  allowing  us  to use  a log  specification.)  In  other  first-  and  second-stage  runs,  we
obtained  qualitatively  similar  results  when,  following  the  example  of  Otoo  (1994),  we
first  adjusted  SSHIFT  forthe  estimated  impact  of real  oil  price  variance  and  deviations
of  output  from  trend  (we  used  the  gap  between  actual  and  DRI's  estimate  of  equilibrium
unemployment).  To  conserve  space,  we  do  not  report  these  results  in  the  tables.
Figure  3 Goes  Here
Unfortunately,  our  empirical  measure  of sector-specific  variance  reflects  both
sector-specific  demand  and  supply  shocks.  The  theoretical  model  implies  that  workers
who  place  relatively  high  weight  on  reducing  real-wage  volatility  are  more  likely  to prefer
to contract  in  the presence  of significant  sector-specific  demand  variance.  An
expanded  version  of  the  model  that  includes  sectoral  supply  variances  indicates  that  an
increase  in  the  variance  of  sector-specific  supply  shocks  has  an  ambiguous  effect,
which  is  consistent  with  the  nonmonotonic  relationship  implied  by  our  theoretical
framework.  Hence,  the  model  has  ambiguous  predictions  for  the  sign  on  our  empirical
measure  of  sectoral  variance.
B.  Fr'rsf-Sfage  Cointegration Resulfs
The  theoretical  model  implies  that  the  use  of  contracts  is  related  to  economic
variables  in  a nonlinear  manner.  Consequently,  we  use  log  specifications  to  test  our
hypotheses.  Because  the  log  level  of  union  share  is  l(2)  and  other  long-run  variables
are  l(1),  the  first-stage  cointegration  tests  use  the  first  difference  of  the  log  of  unionshare  with  logs  of  other  long-run  determinants.  For  this  reason,  the  second-stage  error-
correction  models  use  AAlog(union  share)  as  the  dependent  variable.  Table  2 reports
results  for  the  most  significanl  cointegrating  vector  for  selected  combinations  of  long-
run  variables.  The  Johansen-Juselius  (1990)  procedure  is  used,  partly  because  annual
data  precluded  using  the  Stock  and  Watson  DOLS  approach,  which  consumes  many
degrees  of  freedom.  Results  for  three  combinations  of  long-run  variables  that  each
include  Alog(union  share)  are  presented:  (1)  INF  and  OILVAR  (the  "conventional
model");  (2)  lNF,  OILVAR,  and  SSHIFT3  (the  "noncompetition  model");  and  (3)  lNF,
OILVAR,  SSHIFT3,  and  e  (the  'competition  model").  In  each  case,  there  was  only  one
vector  that  was  significant  at the  5 percent  level  according  to rank  significance.  We  find
in  each  instance  that  higher  sectoral  variance  tends  to reduce  the  extent  of  contracting
via  unionization,  suggesting  that  our  sectoral  variable  reflects  sector-specific  supply
shock  variance  (or  other  factors)  more  than  sector-specific  demand  shock  variance.  s In
addition,  as  noted  earlier,  even  though  the  existence  of  sectoral  demand  shocks  can
create  an  incentive  to use  nominal  wage  contracts,  a marginal  change  in  SSHIFT3  on
net  has  a theoretically  ambiguous  effect  on  the  extent  of  contracting  -  especially  for
countries,  like  the  U.S.,  that  have  low  shares  of  contracting/unionization.  For  this
reason,  it  is  plausible  to  observe  a negative  effect  of  SSHIFT3  on  U.S.  unionization  and
a higher  degree  of  unionization  in  sectors  that  face  greater  sectoral  demand  volatility,
such  as  manufacturing,  energy  (mining),  construction,  and  airlines  (transportation)  -
see  Table  1.
Table  2 Goes  Here
However,  only  in  the  fully  specified  model  that  includes  the  sectoral  variance  and
competition  variables  are  the  signs  of  the  estimated  cointegration  consistent  with
contract  theory.  In  particular,  in  the  other  models  the  cointegrating  vectors  imply  a
positive  relationship  between  inflation  and  unionization.  One  plausible  explanation  fort6
this  stems  from  the  fact  that  inflation  and  the  measure  of competition  tend  to be
negatively  related  overthe  long  run. Hence,  omitting  e  inadvertently  mixes  the  positive
effect  of low  competition  on unionization  with  the negative  impact  of high  inflation  on  the
incentive  to contract.
C. Second-Sfage  Error-Correction  Resulb
As noted  earlier,  because  the  log  level  of  union  share  is  l(2),  the  second-stage
error-correction  models  use  A^log(union  share)  as  the  dependent  variable  with  error-
correction  terms  based  on  cointegrating  relationships  from  Table  2. Table  3 presents
six  models,  the  first  three  of  which  have  no  short-run  terms  but  differ  according  to  which
cointegrating  vector  from  Table  2 was  used  to define  the  error-correction  term. The
other  three  models  corresoond  to models  1.  2.  and  3 in  terms  of  which  error-correction
term  is  used  but  include  two  short-run  variables  -  namely,  the  t lag  of  the  change  in
aggregate  supply  shock  variance  (AOILVAR)  and  a dummy  for  recessions  (RECESS)
which  equals  1 in  years  containing  any  NBER-recession  quarters.  Of  the  first
differences  of  the  various  long-run  variables,  only  the  contemporaneous  first  difference
of  OILVAR  proved  to be  a statistically  significant  short-run  variable.  The  recession
dummy  was  tested  because  during  recessions,  Alog(union  share)  tends  to  be  higher,
plausibly  reflecting  that  union  share  tends  to be  bolstered  in  recessions,  during  which
larger  and  more  unionized  establishments  are  more  likely  to  survive  and  during  which
larger  firms  tend  to cut  back  on  subcontracting  work  to  smaller,  less  unionized  firms.
(More  established  firms  tend  to be  more  unionized,  given  that  it  takes  time  to organize  a
new  firm.)
Table 3 Goes  Here
Four  patterns  arise  across  the  models.  First,  the  competition  models
substantially  outperform  the  corresponding  conventional  and  noncompetition  models,
as  evidenced  by  significant  improvement  in  FP.  Second,  the  correspondingt7
noncompetition  models  outperform  the  conventional  models,  indicating  that  accounting
for  sectoral  shocks  through  the  error-correction  terms  assists  in  explaining  the  changing
pace  of  deunionization.  Third,  the  eror-correction  terms  are  more  significant  and  have
larger  magniludes  in  the  competition  models,  implying  that  shifts  in  competition  have
had  large  effects  on  the  speed  of U.S.  deunionization.  Fourth,  recessions  have
significantly,  albeit  only  temporarily,  slowed  the  pace  of  deunionization.
Figures  4 and  5 shed  further  light  on  these  results.  Figure  4 illustrates  the
importance  of  controlling  for  the  long-run  impact  of  competition  and  sectoral  shocks
(through  the  error-correction  terms)  by  plotting  the  fitted  values  from  models  4 and  6
with  the  actual  values  of  AAlog(union  share).  Clearly,  the  competition  model  (model  6)
more  closely  tracks  movements  in  the  changing  pace  of  deunionization.  To  illustrate
both  the  impact  of  recessions  and  the  more  accurately  measured  long-run  relationships
in  the  competition  model,  Figure  5 plots  the  pace  of  deunionization  (Alog(union  share))
with  the  equilibrium  levels  implied  by  the  error-correction  terms  from  the  competition
and  conventional  models,  with  shaded  areas  indicating  recessions.  In  both  cases,
Alog(union  share)  tends  to be  notably  higherthan  the  equilibrium  levels  during
recessions,  while  in  nonrecessionary  periods  the  equilibrium  values  from  the
competition  model  more  closely  track  Alog(union  share)  than  do  the  equilibrium  values
from  the  conventional  model.
Figures  4 and  5 Go  Here
V. Gonclusion
Conventional  models  of  wage  contracting  typically  focus  on  the  role  of  aggregate
demand  and  supply  shocks,  largely  because  they  assume  that  the  economy  is
homogeneous  and  that  goods  markets  are  characterized  by  perfect  competition  or  a
constant  degree  of  competition.  By  examining  endogenous  wage  contracting  in  al8
multisector  economy,  we  conclude  that  sectoral  output  variance  and  changes  in  the
degree  of goods-market  competition  theoretically  should  affect  the  aggregate  extent  of
wage  contracting.  Our  empirical  results  indicate  that  greater  sectoral  output  variance
and  greater  competition  both  reduce  the use  of wage  contracts.
Although  direct  comprehensive  time-series  measures  of  wage  contracting  in  the
United  States  are  not  available,  we  argue  that  the  degree  of  private  sector  unionization
is  a reasonable  proxy.  Consistent  with  our  theoretical  model,  we  flnd  that  unionization
is  decreasing  in  tfie  aggregate  degree  of  goods-market  competition.  Consistent  with
our  time-series  findings,  Figure  6 illustrates  that  the  most  pronounced  declines  in
unionization  since  the  early  '1980s  have  occurred,  on  average,  in  sectors  that  faced
stiffer  foreign  competition  (e.9.,  manufacturing)  or  were  deregulated  in  the  late  1970s  or
early  1980s  (communications,  transportation,  finance/insurance/real  estate,  and
mining).  While  differences  in  factors  can  affect  the  cross-industry  pattern  of
unionization  at  a given  point  in  time,  deregulation  and  foreign  competition  appearto
affect  changes  in these  relative  cross-industry  patterns  across  time.
X'igure  6 Goes  Here
Furthermore,  unless  one  includes  measures  of  both  competition  and  sectoral
output  variance,  misspecification  may  lead  one  to  conclude  empirically  that  inflation  risk
boosts  unionization,  contrary  to  contract  theory  in  general.  Our  modified  empirical
model  outperforms  a conventional  model,  particularly  in  the  low-  to moderate-inflation
period  since  the  early  1980s  and  especially  in  the  low-inflation  environment  of  the  early
1990s.  Our  theoretical  and  empirical  results  also  confirm  the  conventional  wisdom
among  economists  that  unionization  largely  depends  on  barriers  that  impede  goods-
market  competition,  whether  that  protection  is  from  international  or  intranational
competition.l9
Appendix  A: Measuring  Contract  Share
Lacking  comprehensive  measures  of  the  share  of U.S.  workers  under  contracts,
we  used  data  on  unionization  rates.  Although  many  workers  have  their  pay  adjusted
annually,  we  are  more  interested  in  contracts  over  a year  in  length,  because  such
contracts  expose  agents  to a greater  risk  of expectational  errors  resulting  from
underlying  aggregate  and  sectoral  shocks,  which  determine  contract  share  in  our
theoretical  model.  Union  contracts  generally  exceed  a year  in  length,  and  forthis
reason  unionization  rates  appear  to  be  a reasonably  good  proxy  for  contract  share.
For  1983-1996,  we use  the  Bureau  of Labor  Statistics  (BLS)  annual  series  on
private-sector  unionization  rates,  including  employee  association  members.  Prior  to
1983,  we  use  Troy  and  Sheflin's  (1985)  annual  series  for  1956-1982,  which  also
includes  employee  association  members.  The  two  series  have  one  overlapping  data
point  in 1983.  For  this  year  Troy  and  Sheflin  report  a unionization  rate  of 1  7.8  percenl,
whereas  the  BLS  reports  a rate  of 1B.B  percent.  To  adjust  for  this  small  difference,  we
added  one  percentage  point  to  the  Troy  and  Sheflin  1956-1982  data  to  create  a spliced
series  covering  the  entire  1956-1996  period.
Our  sample  begins  in 1956  for  five  reasons.  First,  by  this  year  labor  markets  had
adjusted  to  the  pro-union  policies  of  the  Roosevelt  and  early  Truman  administrations,
which  had  fostered  a sizable  run-up  in  union  membership  in  the  1930s  and  1940s.
Second,  the  series  begins  after  labor  markets  adjusted  to  the  Taft-Hartley  Act  of 1949,
which  worked  to slow  the  growth  of  unions.  Third,  the  sample  begins  after  unionization
rates  adjusted  to  the  end  of  the  Korean  War  (union  share  peaked  in  1953  and  leveled
off  in  1956-57).  Fourth,  this  sample  allows  us  to use  post-Korean  War  profit  data  to
construct  lags  of  first  differences  of  the  degree  of  goods-market  competition,  which  we
use  in  the  second-stage  error-correction  models  of  the  change  in  unionization  share.
Fifth,  our  aggregate  demand  shock  proxy,  CPI  inflalion,  was  negative  in  levels  in 1955,
precluding  the  use  of  a log  (interactive)  specification  on  samples  starting  before  1956.20
Appendix  B: Measuring  the Degree  of Goods-Market  Competition
Following  Duca  and  VanHoose  (1997  and  1998),  we  measure  the  aggregate
price  elasticity  of  demand  by  deriving  a cyclically  adjusted  time  series  of  the  average
markup  of  price  over  marginal  cost. Our  focus  is  in  long-run  movements  in  the  markup,
in  contrast  to  studies  of  whether  markups  are  cyclical  [e.9.,  Basu  and  Fernald  (1994),
Ramey  (1991),  Rotemberg  and  Woodford  (1991)1.  We  assume  constant  returns  to
scale,  consistent  with  Basu  and  Fernald,  and  derive  the  markup  using  profits  data
We estimate  the  following  specification  of profits:
(81)  /'= constant  - F,(FC)  + FJ +  trend,
where  zr=  profits/sales,  FC  =  fixed  costs/sales,  and  X is  a vector  of  variables  controlling
for  cyclical  and  other  short-run  factors.  From  (Bl),  profit  share  is  adjusted  for  short-run
factors  (/  = n- 9zX),  which  implies  a cyclically  adjusted  markup  as  tf = 1  - 1lf ,where
y' : price/marginal  cost.  The  standard  model  of  imperfect  competition  implies  y' - 1  =
1l(e-  1)  and  s= 1lf ,where  a= lprice  elasticity  of  demandl.
To  implement  (81),  we  include  nominal  nonfinancial  corporate  GDP  to prory  for
sales,  two  measures  of fixed  costs,  and  several  terms  to control  for short-run
movements.  In  principle,  fixed  costs  can  be  measured  by  the  ratios  of  consumption  of
fixed  capital  and  net  interest  to nonfinancial  corporate  GDP  (DEP  and  NET,
respectively).r1  However,  because  of  shifts  in  the  use  of  debt  and  equity  and  the
difficulty  of  disentangling  equity  inveslment  from  stock  price  shifts,  NET  reflects  swings
in  leverage,  as  well  as  in  interest  rates,  spreads  between  corporate  and  Treasury  rates,
and  in  inventory  financing.  Because  NET  thereby  will  give  a distorted  picture  of  fixed
costs,  we  also  sublract  off  its  estimated  impact  in  measuring  the  long-run  markup  e
To  cyclically  adjust  profits  (after  IVA  and  CCAdj  adjustments),  we  include  the  t
through  t-3  lags  of real  GDP  growth  (Ay),  year-over{ear  GDP  groMh  lagged  four?l
quarters  (YOYAy),  and  the  f and  f-1  lags  of  the  civilian  unemployment  rate  (U),  adjusted
for  the  1994  survey  change.  10  To  control  for  temporary  profit  swings  stemming  from
real-exchange-rate  swings,  the  f-1  through  f-4  lags  of  the  real  dollar  exchange  rate
(RER)  are  included.  "  RER  tracks  the  mid-1980s  decline  in  profits  stemming  from  the
dollar's  huge  appreciation  and  recovery  owing  to  the  subsequent  depreciation.  We  use
levels  of RER  since  the  RER  series  is  dominated  by  a mid-1980s  hump  that  depressed
profits  even  as  the  dollar  fell  off  its  1985  highs.  Of  the  oil  variables  tested,  the  most
significant  were  changes  (f  to  f-3  lags  of  AOIL  and  the  f-4  lag  of  the  year-over-year
change  in  real  oil  prices,  YAOIL)  in  the  real  retail  price  of  energy  (CPl  energy/CPl).  1'z  In
the  oil-induced  recessions  of  the  1970s,  profits  fell  less  than  in  other  recessions
because  oil  profits  lumped.  To  control  for  such  differences,  the  lags  and  construction  of
oil  terms  parallel  those  of  the  GDP  terms.  In  addition  to  cyclical  variables,  we  adjust  for
profit  margin  restrictions  during  the  Nixon  price  controls  by  including  dummy  variables
for  each  quarter  when  controls  were  in  effect.  t3
Using  a 1953:Q1-96:Q4  sample,  the  model  used  to  construct  e (-1lf)is:22
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+ 0.051  6A0lL  t-r-  + 0.03384O1L  €' + 0.0236AYOYO|L  t4'  - 0.00009RER  t  1
(3.76)  (2.53)  (2.36)  (-1.08)
-  0.00009RERtz  +  0.00003RERt-3"  - 0.0002RERr.4'-  0.0018D714
(-1.08)  (0.24)  (-2.66)  (-0.61)
- 0.0055D721  - O.O104D722'-  0.0106D723'  - 0.0097D724'
(-1.46)  (-2.34)  (-2.27)  (-2.01)
- 0.0065D731  - 0.00s2D732  - 0.0064D733  - 0.0064D734'
(-1  .36)  (-1.14)  (-1  .5e)  (-2.11)
R'?=  0.979,  D.W.  =  2.03,  Q(24)  = 16.63,  and.dl)  =  0.9S. - (-)  denotes  significance  at  the  99%  (95%)  level.
t statistics  are in parentheses.
(Note  that  in  other  runs,  linear,  quadratic,  and  cubic  time  trend  terms  were  individually
and  jointly  insignificant  and  did  not  affect  the  qualitative  results.)
The  model  results  are not  surprising.  The  positive  GDP  coefficients  reflect  the
procyclicality  of profits.  The  negative  sign  on U,  and  the  positive  sign  on U,_,'  reflect  that
profits  are  reduced  by  the  level  and  change  in  unemployment.  14  The  positive
ACPIOILT-1  coefficients  mainly  reflect  that  profits  did  not  fall  as  much  in  oil-price-hike-
induced  recessions  as in other  recessions,  while  the negative  effects  of real  exchange
rates  track  the  negative  impact  of  the  dollar's  appreciation  on  profits  in  the  mid-1980s.
The  estimated  effects  of  all  the  variables  except  DEP  and  the  time  trends  are
subtracted  from  zr,to  yield  f ,. The  averages  of quarterly  data  on zf,  are used  to
construct  annual  measures  of a.Appendix  C: Measuring  Sectoral  Employment  Variance
The  variance  of  sectoral  shocks  (SSHIFT)  is  proxied  by  shifts  in  the  share  of
nominal  output  produced  by  different  U.S.  industries,  defined  as  the  sum  of  squared
percentage  point  changes  in  industry  output  shares:
55
(C1) SSHIFT  = E='[100  x (SHARq.r  - SHAREl.,_l)1'z,
where  subscript  I denotes  industry  j, subscript  t denotes  the  year,  and  SHARE,  =
(PtY;)/PYl,  with  P;: industry  price  and  Yj  = industry  real  outpul,  and  PY  = aggregate
nominal  output.  Based  on  the  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis's  estimates  of  gross
product  originating  (GPO)  by  2-digit  SIC-code  industries,  we  use  55  different  categories
of  industries.  SSHIFT  corresponds  to  calculating  a  weighted  average  of  the  variance  of
sectoral  growth  rates  across  industries.  The  degree  of  shifts  in  nominal  output  share
roughly  proxy  the  extent  of  shifts  in  expenditure  share,  which  empirically  corresponds  to
the  relative  demand  shock  term  (d)  in  the  theoretical  model.  However,  the  measure
likely  reflects  sectoral  supply  shocks  as  well. Industry  output  shares  are  used  instead
of  expenditure  share  data,  because  the  lafter  are  very  inconsistently  aggregated  across
time,  do  not  easily  permit  combining  consumption  and  investment  purchases  by  product
type,  and  do  not  readily  allow  for  precise  allocations  of  domestic  and  net  export
spending  categories  to particular  industries.
The  gross  domestic  product  industry  data  were  adjusted  for several  breaks  in
data  categories  stemming  from  changes  in  industry  classification  in 1959  and  1987.
First,  the  broader  pre-1  959  category  of  "real  estate"  was  used.  Detailed  data  on  the
division  between  "nonfarm  housino  services"  and  "other  real  estate"  were  not  available
for  the  pre-1959  period.24
Second,  separate  data  for  "social  services"  and  'membership  organizations
were  not  available  prior  to 1959.  Hence,  we  treated  these  post-1958  categories  as  a
single  category.
Third,  the  pre-1987  category  of  "miscellaneous  professional  services"  was
replaced  by an "other  services"  category,  and  some  "business  services"  output  was
reclassified  into  this  new  "other  services  category."  To  minimize  data  distortions,  the
pre-1987  categories  of  "business  services"  and  "miscellaneous  professional  services"
were  combined  to create  a "business  and  other  services"  category  that  is  defined  using
post-1987  data  as  the  sum  of  "business  services"  and  "other  services."
Fourth,  the  pre-1987  categories  of  "banking"  and  "credit  agencies"  were  replaced
by  two  different  post-1987  categories  of  "depository  institutions"  and  "nondepository
institutions."  Because  the  sums  of  output  in  the  two  respective  groups  of  industries
were  equal  in 1987  while  the  detailed  breakdowns  differed  greatly,  these  four
categories  were  replaced  by  the  created  category  of "depository  and  nondepository
institutions,"  which  we  defined  as  the  sum  of  the  pre-1987  categories  of  "banking"  and
"credit  agencies'  before  1988  and  the  sum  of  the  post-1987  categories  of  "depository
institutions"  and  "nondepository  institutions"  after  1987.
Fifth,  there  were  several  shifts  in classification  that  involved  the renaming  of two
categories  in 1987  and  the  redefinition  of  a category  that  retained  its  name.  To  prevent
these  classification  shifts  from  creating  a spike  in  SSHIFT,  we  combined  the  involved
categories  into  a "general  machinery"  category,  defined  as  the  sum  of nominal  output  in
the  "machinery  except  electrical,"  "electric  and  electronic  equipment,"  and  "instruments
and  related  products"  categories  before  1987  and  afterward  as  the  sum  of  nominal
output  in  the  "industrial  machinery  and  equipment,"  "electronic  and  other  electrica
equipment,"  and  "instrument  and  related  products."Sixth,  we  excluded  the  category  "holding  and  other  investment  offices."  Nominal
output  estimates  for  this  very  small  sector  were  negative  in  recent  years,  making  these
estimates  highly  dubious.
Finally,  overlapping  data  for  1987  using  the  pre-1987  and  post-1987
classification  schemes  revealed  some  slight  differences  in the  categories  of "furniture
and  fixtures,"  "stone,  clay,  and  glass  products,"  "paper  and  allied  products,"  "rubber  and
miscellaneous  plastics  products,'  "telephone  and  telegraph,"  "radio  and  television,"
"legal  services,"  and  "amusement  and  recreation  services."  To  prevent  the  relatively
small  differences  in  output  levels  arising  from  more  minor  reclassification  shifts  from
creating  an  artificial  spike  in  SSHIFT,  the  value  of  SSHIFT  for  1987  was  based  on
comparing  1  986  output  shares  with  1  987  output  shares  using  the  pre-1988  data  basis,
whereas  the  1988  value  of  SSHIFT  was  based  on  the  posf  1987  classification  scheme.26
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FOOTNOTES
' Duca's  (1987)  framework  in  turn  derives  from  Blinder  and  Mankiw  (1984).  Waller
(1992)  and  Walsh  (1995)  have  applied  lhis  multisector  approach  to  examinations  of
political  tensions  that  can  arise  in  the  choice  of  a central  banker  and  of  a central
banking  contract.  Ramagopal  (1990,  1994)  has  extended  the  Duca-VanHoose
(1991)  framework  to  explore  tax-policy  issues,  and  Ghosal  and  Loungani  (1996)  find
evidence  supporting  its  essential  implications.
' The  labor  supply  function  is  consistent  with  a utility  function  that  is  additively
separable  in consumption  and  leisure.  While  an  alternative  approach,  such  as  a
shoppingtime  framework,  would  yield  more  a more  general  framework,  our  model  is
includes  aggregate,  sectoral,  supply,  and  demand  shocks  but  is  sufficiently  tractable
to  yield  interpretable  comparative  static  results.  In  addition,  by  extending  the
frameworks  of  seminal  papers  by  Gray,  Ball,  Woglom,  and  others,  we  are  better  able
use  our  macroeconomic  approach  to analyze  the  determinants  of  contract  usage  and
to  develop  better-performing  empirical  models  of  aggregate  wage  contracting.
' In  a less  stylized  framework,  of course,  mean  real  wages  could  differ  at contracting
and  noncontracting  firms.
o  This  assumption  contrasts  with  Wogom  (1990),  in  which  risk  sharing  between
workers  and  firms  is a central  feature.
' lf  sectoral  productivity  shocks  are  incorporated  into  the  model,  which  we  have  not
exposited  because  of  the  exceeding  complicated  expressions  that  result,  the  critical
value  of  1-changes,  but  this  qualitative  conclusion  is  unaffected.
u  The  critical  value  of  f relevant  for  this  comparison  need  not  be  as  large  as  the  critical
value  determining  the  effect  of  greater  sectoral  volatility  on  equilibrium  contract
share,  however.
?  We  use  inflation  rather  than  velocity  shocks  to measure  aggregate  demand  variance
mainly  because  long-run  instability  in  money  velocity  and  redefinitions  of  monetary
aggregates  (both  Ml and  M2)  make  it  difficult  to construct  realtime  measures  that
were  widely  observed  by  workers  and  firms.
' For  example,  if  increased  variances  in  sectoral  output  shares  are  correlated  with
surges  in  the  pace  of  business  formation,  unionization  rates  could  fall  because  it
takes  time  to organize  the  greater  number  of  workers  employed  at new  firms  into
unions.
' For  example,  the  profit-output  ratio  would  fall  if  firms  levered  up  and  then  would
rebound  if  firms  delever,  because  firms  would  make  greater  payments  to  debt  capital
holders  than  to  equity  capital  holders.  Not  adjusting  for  this  swing,  the  cyclically30
adjusted  profit-output  ratio  would  be  U-shaped,  as  it  was  during  the  late-1980s  rise  in
leverage  and  the  early-1990s  fall  in  leverage.
'o  The  dyt-i  control  for short-run  growth  effects,  and  the  four-quarter  lag  of YOYAy
controls  for slightly  longer  lagged  effects.  To control  for  the level  of resource
utlization,  we include  the  unemployment  rate  [downwardly  adiusied  by  0.2  points
after  1993  since  the  1994  change  in  the  household  survey  added  0.2  points  to  the
unemployment  rate  (BLS  estimates)1.  Other  lags  of U  were  insignificant.
. Contemporaneous  RER  was  very  insignificant.  The  Federal  Reserve  Board's  real-
exchange-rate  measure  (covering  10 nations)  is used  because  it covers  the  early
1970s,  in  contrast  to other  measures.  Because  the  series  begins  in 1967:Q1  and
because  exchange  rates  were  fixed  earlier,  before  1967:Q1  we  set  RERE  at  its
1967:Q1  level.  This  assumption  likely  has  little  effect  on  the  result  that  the  real-
exchange-rate  time  series  is  dominated  by  the  mid-1980s  hump.
" Because  CPI  energy  data  begin  in 1957,  prior  real  energy  prices  equal  the  ratio  of
the  personal  consumption  expenditures  (PCE)  index  for  gasoline  and  oil  (1987
weights)  prices  to the  overall  PCE  prices.  The  PCE  rations  were  break-adusted  by
the  1957:1  ratio  of  real  CPI  energy  prices  to real  PCE  energy  prices.  Since  real  oil
price  movements  are  dominated  by  changes  in 1973-74,  1  979-80,  and  1986,  this
reasonable  assumption  has  little  effect  on  coefficient  estimates,  while  permifting  us
to  extend  the  samples  by  two  more  annual  observations.
" The  Nixon  controls  capped  profit  margins  at  low  recessionary  levels  and  delayed  a
cyclical  recovery  in profits  (Economic  Repoft  of the  President,  1974,  p. 9'1  and  1973,
p.  65). Separate  quarterly  estimates  are  used  since  a single  dummy  for  the  period
1971  4-73:4  would  not  reflect  how  different  ohases  of the  controls  and  their
bindingness  changed  during  this  economic  recovery.
'4  Denoting  the  coefficients  on  U,  and  U,-,  as  p.,  and  Br,  the  unemployment  effects  can
be  expressed  as  (P1+82)Ut  - (FrU,  -prUul)  = (B,+pr)U,-  prAU1.Table  l-:  Changes in  the  Cross-Sector  Pattern  of  Unionization










































Decompositlg  the  7983-95  DecTine  in  Unionization
Absolute  Chanze
OveralL  Unionization  Share
Due to  Emp  Toryent  Slrif ts
Due to  Within  Sector
Declines  in  Unionization
-7.6
1.  Decline  due to  enployment  shifts  equals  euployrnent-share  adjusted  1983
unionization  rate  (ll-.45)  minus the  1996 unionization  rate  (L1,.2).  The
employnent-share adiusted  l-983 unionization  race equals  the  sum of  1983
erniloy'rnenc  shares b!  industry  muLtiplied  by  their  iorresponding  1996 sectoral
unionization  shares.rADTE Z: Colntegrating
(!eithout
Conv er,t  iona!
+0  .  010
Vectors  For  Alog(Union  Share  )












Max E  j.gen
Trace
tt  cidn  va^l-^re






















-0 .  002
-0  .  014





:  Annual  CPI inflation.  Proxy  for  inflation  risk.
:  3-year  variance  of  real  consumer energy  prices.
Proxy for  aggregate  suppLy shocks.
SSHIFT3  :  1-year  variiice-of  indultly  noninal  output.
Proxy  for  sectoral  output  shocks.
e  :  lndex  of  the  degree  of  goods narket  competition.
a.  Coefficients  reported  so that  a positive  sign  on a variable  X implies  that
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